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INTRODUCTION 
This appeal involves, literally, a four-letter dispute. In two instances, 
"-or" mistakenly became "-ee," creating obvious typographical errors in an 
unambiguous leasehold mortgage in which the term "mortgagee" was 
inadvertently typed instead of "mortgagor." 
Appellant Wolf Mountain Resorts, LC ("Wolf) and appeUee ASC Utah, 
Inc. ("ASCU") are parties to a leasehold mortgage that was designed to secure 
certain obligations of ASCU, as mortgagor and tenant, to Wolf, as mortgagee 
and landlord, under a Ground Lease related to property used for the 
operation of The Canyons ski resort. The property interest which ASCU 
mortgaged is ASCU's "right, title and interest in an Amended and Restated 
Lease Agreement Number 419, by and between the State of Utah, School and 
Institutional Trust Lands Administration, as landlord, and Mortgagor 
[ASCU], as tenant," referred to as the "Mortgaged Estate." Wolf and ASCU 
intended to classify certain events as defaults under the leasehold mortgage, 
but they also employed limited exceptions. Thus, under the "Due-on-Sale" 
clause, it is an event of default for ASCU to sell, transfer, convey, or assign (i) 
"all or any portion of, or any interest in, the Mortgaged Estate," or (ii) "any 
controlling ownership interest in and to the Mortgagor [ASCU]." However, 
the parties recognized two exceptions wherein such transfers would not be an 
event of default. The "First Exception" exempts collateral assignment of the 
Mortgaged Estate to a bona fide third party lender from being a default, 
provided that the assignment specifically states that it is subject to certain 
rights of Wolf as the Mortgagee. Similarly, under the "Second Exception" the 
transfer is not a default if it was a "transfer of all or substantially all" of 
ASCU's interests in The Canyons resort, including its interests as tenant 
under the Ground Lease, provided that the transfer specifically states it is 
subject to Wolfs rights as Mortgagee under the leasehold mortgage. 
The "Second Exception" was ultimately reduced to writing as follows: 
except for . . . (ii) any transfer of all or substantially all of 
Mortgagee's rights in and to the development currently 
known as The Canyons (including, without limitation, all of 
Mortgagee's interest as tenant under the Ground Lease and 
the Mortgaged Estate) whether effected by stock or asset 
sale, provided that such transfer shall be expressly subject to 
each and every one of the Hens, rights and interests of the 
Mortgagee under this Leasehold Mortgage. For purposes of 
the foregoing sentence, "substantially all" shall include all of 
the assets held by Mortgagor which are necessary for 
unimpeded operation and development of The Canyons 
resort as it currently exists or may be improved. 
Under well-settled principles of contract interpretation, the only reasonable 
interpretation of this provision, when viewing the entire contract as a whole, 
is to construe the first two references to " Mortgagee" as "Mortgagor." The 
mortgage defines ASCU (Mortgagor), as the tenant—not Wolf. The mortgage 
defines the Mortgaged Estate as ASCU's interest—not Wolfs. The 
provision's purpose is to carve out an exception so that a sale of all of ASCU's 
stock is not an event of default so long as the sale is expressly subject to 
Wolfs rights as Mortgagee. It would make no sense to carve out an exception 
for a sale of Wolfs interests so long as the sale was subject to Wolfs interests 
as Mortgagee. Thus, the first two uses of the term "Mortgagee," as italicized 
above, are obvious typographical errors. The interpretation of the Due-on-
Sale-Clause's Second Exception that Wolf proffers in its brief renders the 
exception an absurdity, is nonsensical, and ignores the purpose of the Due-
on-Sale provision, as well as the plain language of other portions of this and 
other provisions of the Leasehold Mortgage. 
The district court closely analyzed the contract documents, and 
determined that Wolfs disingenuous interpretation made no sense. 
Accordingly, the district court granted ASCU's motion for summary 
judgment, finding as a matter of law that a sale of ASCU's capital stock in 
2007 did not violate the leasehold mortgage because the sale complied with 
the "Second Exception." 
Wolf insists that correcting the typographical mistake and conforming 
to the parties' obvious intentions offends the principles of contract 
interpretation. To the contrary, the district court's analysis and conclusion 
were not in error; they complied fully with established Utah law regarding 
contract interpretation. Accordingly, ASCU requests that the Court affirm 
the district court's order, which denied Wolfs motion for summary judgment 
and granted ASCU's cross-motion. 
JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT 
Jurisdiction is proper under Utah Code Ann. § 78A-4-103. 
COUNTERSTATEMENT OF ISSUES ON APPEAL 
Issue 1. Did the trial court err in granting ASCU's cross-motion for 
summary judgment based on a reading of the parties' 
leasehold mortgage that considered the leasehold mortgage 
as a whole and harmonized its various provisions? 
Standard of Review. Appellate courts in Utah "review a district court's 
grant [or denial] of summary judgment for correctness, affording no deference 
to the district court." Jennings Inv., LC v. Dixie Riding Club, Inc., 2009 UT 
App 119, t 5, 208 P.3d 1077 (quoting Bluffdale City v. Smith, 2007 UT App 
25, 115, 156 P.3d 175). The question of whether a contract provision is 
ambiguous, i.e., susceptible to two or more reasonable interpretations, is a 
question of law. Home Sav. and Loan v. Aetna Cas. And Sur. Co., 817 P.2d 
341, 347 (Utah App. 1991) (citations omitted). 
Issue 2. Did the trial court err in excluding extrinsic evidence where 
the court was presented with unambiguous contracts? 
Standard of Review. "Questions of contract interpretation which are 
confined to the language of the contract itself are questions of law, which we 
review for correctness." Mellor v. Wasatch Crest Mut. Ins. Co., 2009 UT 5, f 
7, 201 P.3d 1004. "If a contract is deemed ambiguous, and the trial court 
allows extrinsic evidence of intent, interpretation of the contract becomes a 
factual matter and our review is strictly limited.' " Radman v. Flanders 
Corp., 2007 UT App 351, 1 5, 172 P.3d 668 (quoting Nielsen v. Gold's Gym, 
2003 UT 37, t 6, 78 P.3d 600). 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Wolf Mountain Resorts, L.C. ('Wolf) commenced this action against 
ASC Utah, Inc. ("ASCU") and a number other defendants1 in September 2007 
seeking, among other things, to foreclose a leasehold mortgage under which 
ASCU was the mortgagor and Wolf the mortgagee. (R. 1-9). Wolf alleged that 
the sale of all of ASCU's stock to Talisker Canyons Finance Co., LLC 
("Talisker Canyons") was an "event of default" that permitted Wolf to 
foreclose and recoup damages. 
Following discovery, Wolf moved for partial summary judgment under 
Utah R. Civ. P. 56 seeking a declaration that ASCU had defaulted under the 
parties' Leasehold Mortgage. (R. 187-191). ASCU cross-moved, on the 
grounds that the only reasonable interpretation of the contract documents 
was to provide an exception to the due-on-sale clause for transfers of ASCU's 
assets that were expressly subject to Wolfs rights as mortgagee; and because 
the transfer of ASCU's capital stock to Talisker was subject to Wolfs 
1
 Wolf also sued General Electric Capital Company, Enoch Richard Smith, the 
estate of Enoch Smith, Jr., Gulp Construction Company, Richard Brande Drywall, 
Inc., Designteam Inc., and STF Electrical Services, Inc. Its claims against these 
defendants were dismissed. 
mortgagee rights, it fell within this exception and was not, as a matter of law, 
an event of default under the leasehold mortgage. 
In a ruling and order dated March 26, 2010, the court below granted 
ASCU's motion and denied Wolfs motion. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
ASCU operates The Canyons ski resort in Summit County, Utah. (R. 3). 
In 1997, ASCU, as tenant, entered into a Ground Lease2 with Wolf, as 
landlord, for certain property in Summit County, including some of the land 
upon which The Canyons operates. Pursuant to the Ground Lease, ASCU 
agreed to pay Wolf, as annual rent payments, 4% of ASCU's gross sales and 
lodging revenues at The Canyons and 11% of certain construction and 
development costs, as well as certain one-time payments based on paid skier 
visits to The Canyons as additional rent. (Ground Lease at § 3.01). 
Several tracts of land are covered by the Ground Lease; one such tract 
("Section 2") was leased by Wolf from the State of Utah through its School 
and Institutional Trust Lands Administration pursuant to the "SITLA 
Lease." (R. 3). In 1998, With Wolfs consent, ASCU renegotiated and became 
the direct tenant under the SITLA Lease pursuant to an Amended and 
2
 Hereinafter, the "Ground Lease," a true and correct copy of which is attached as 
Exhibit 1 to Wolfs February 9, 2010 Combined Reply Memorandum in Support of 
Wolf Mountain's Motion for Partial Summary Judgment and Memorandum in 
Opposition to Defendant ASC Utah, Inc.'s Cross-Motion for Partial Summary 
Judgment ("Wolf Combined Reply") (R. 216-260). 
Restated Lease Agreement No. 419 (the "Amended and Restated Lease").3 
The resort's master plan provides for residential development on the Section 
2 parcel; this development is referred to as the Red Pine Village. (R. 3). 
The Ground Lease authorizes ASCU to transfer its interests under the 
Ground Lease, including by sale of all or substantially all of ASCU's voting 
stock or assets, under certain limited conditions. Specifically, § 10.02 of the 
Ground Lease states: 
Assignment. [ASCU] shall not assign all or any portion of 
the Lease without obtaining the prior written consent of 
[Wolf] to any such assignment, which consent [Wolf] may 
not unreasonably withhold or delay. Notwithstanding the 
foregoing, Tenant shall not be prohibited from assigning all 
or any portion of its interest hereunder to any entity 
affiliated with [ASCU]. Except as provided below, [ASCU] 
and Holdings shall remain fully liable to perform their 
respective obligations under this Lease and the related 
Guaranty, notwithstanding any assignment permitted 
hereunder. 
A sale of all or substantially all [ASCU's] assets, or a 
transfer of record or beneficial ownership of more than 50% 
of the voting stock of [ASCU] to a party unaffiliated with 
[ASCU], whether by merger, consolidation, or other 
reorganization, shall constitute an "assignment" for 
purposes of this Section 10.02. In such event, [Wolf] may 
not unreasonably withhold or delay its consent provided 
that the proposed successor of [ASCU] shall be a person or 
business organization with financial condition and 
operating capability and expense reasonably adequate to 
3
 A true and correct copy is attached as Exhibit B to Defendant ASC Utah, Inc. 's 
Combined Memorandum: In Opposition to Wolf Mountain's Motion for Partial 
Summary Judgment and in Support of ASC Utah, Inc/s Cross-Motion for Summary 
Judgment ("ASCU Combined Memo/') (R. 196-217). 
operate the premises in a manner consistent with other 
comparably sized ski resorts throughout the United States. 
(Ground Lease at § 10.02). 
In November 1999, ASCU and Wolf executed an amendment to the 
Ground Lease (the "Second Amendment," Exhibit 2 to Wolf Combined Reply). 
Among other things, the Second Amendment provides that if and when 
ASCU receives all necessary approvals to commence construction of units at 
Red Pine Village, ASCU shall grant to Wolf fee simple title to the land for 100 
lodging units at that location. Under the Second Amendment, ASCU agreed 
to secure its obligation by providing a mortgage to Wolf. Specifically, Section 
12 of the Second Amendment states: 
One Hundred Units. [ASCU] shall grant to [Wolf] fee 
simple title to land, free and clear of all liens and 
encumbrances, excepting the Village Management 
Agreement and the Development Agreement, within Red 
Pine Village (the "Red Pine Parcel") on which [ASCU] has 
obtained approval from Summit County for one hundred 
(100) Hotel/Lodging Units (as defined in the Development 
Agreement) (the "100 Units") in Red Pine village, 
contemporaneously with [ASCU's] receipt from Summit 
County of all necessary approvals to commence 
construction of its first phase of development of 
Hotel/Lodging Units in Red Pine Village. To secure [Wolfs] 
interest, [ASCU] shall execute and deliver to [Wolf] a 
leasehold mortgage . . . of [ASCU's] option to purchase that 
portion of the State of Utah School and Institutional Trust 
Lands Administration lands required to satisfy [ASCU's] 
obligation hereunder. The leasehold mortgage shall not in 
any way limit or reduce [ASCU's] obligation to deliver the 
Red Pine Parcel to [Wolf] as required hereunder. There 
shall be no time restriction on the delivery of the 100 Units 
other than the requirement that delivery be 
contemporaneous with the approval, if any, of [ASCU's] 
first phase of Hotel/Lodging Unit development in Red Pine 
Village. [Wolf] and [ASCU] shall cooperatively determine 
the planning, design, and configuration of the 100 Units, 
provided that such planning and design shall be in all 
respects consistent with the planning, design, and 
architectural guidelines for Red Pine Village. The 100 
Units shall be an average representative of the entire mix 
of Hotel/Lodging Units in Red Pine Village, with an 
average size of 1500 square feet, subject to Summit County 
approval. [ASCU] shall, at its expense, deliver the final 
recorded plat for the 100 Units, including all planning, 
engineering, design, and architecture associated therewith. 
[ASCU] shall at its sole cost and expense stub roads and all 
utilities to the boundaries of the lots on which the 100 
Units are located. [ASCU] shall at its own cost provide 
[Wolf] with water rights and entitlement to water delivery 
for the entire project including the 100 Units. . . . 
(Second Amendment at f^f 5-6). 
On or about November 23, 2005, ASCU and Wolf executed a "Leasehold 
Mortgage" with Wolf as mortgagee and ASCU as mortgagor.4 The 
Leasehold Mortgage defines a limited number of events as defaults. Among 
them, according to the "Due-on-Sale" clause: 
Any of the following shall be an event of default ("Event of 
Default"): 
(iv) any sale, transfer, conveyance or assignment of any or 
all portion of, or any interest in, the Mortgaged Estate, or 
the sale, transfer, conveyance or assignment of any 
controlling ownership interest in and to the Mortgagor 
4
 A true and correct copy of the Leasehold Mortgage is attached as Exhibit B to the 
Brief of Appellant (hereinafter, "Wolf Brief). 
(which shall not include transfer of controlling ownership 
interest in the Mortgagor's parent or shareholders). . . . 
(Leasehold Mortgage at § 4.A(iv)). There are two exceptions, however, to the 
Due-on-Sale clause. The "First Exception" exempts collateral assignment of 
the Mortgaged Estate to a bona fide third party lender from being a default, 
provided that the assignment specifically states that it is subject to certain 
rights of Wolf as the Mortgagee. Similarly, the "Second Exception" states: 
except for . . . (ii) any transfer of all or substantially all of 
Mortgagee's rights in and to the development currently 
known as The Canyons (including, without limitation, all of 
Mortgagee's interest as tenant under the Ground 
Lease and the Mortgaged Estate) whether effected by stock 
or asset sale, provided that such transfer shall be 
expressly subject to each and every one of the liens, 
rights and interests of the Mortgagee under this 
Leasehold Mortgage. For purposes of the foregoing 
sentence, "substantially all" shall include all of the 
assets held by Mortgagor which are necessary for 
unimpeded operation and development of The Canyons 
resort as it currently exists or may be improved. The terms 
of this Paragraph A. shall be strictly construed, and if any 
collateral assignment hereunder does not include the 
specific language of agreement and acknowledgment in 
favor of Mortgagee as required by this paragraph, such 
collateral assignment shall be null and void. 
(Leasehold Mortgage at § 4.A(iv)) (emphasis added). 
On July 15, 2007, ASCU and ASCU's then parent company, American 
Skiing Company ("ASC"), entered into an agreement with Talisker Canyons 
and Talisker Corp. (together, "Talisker") for ASC to transfer all of the 
outstanding capital stock of ASCU to Talisker. (R. 7, 26). The Talisker 
Purchase Agreement clearly and unambiguously binds Talisker Canyons to 
each and every one of the liens, rights and interests of Wolf under the 
Leasehold Mortgage: "the transfer of title to Buyer is subject to each and 
every one of the liens, rights and interests of Wolf under the Leasehold 
Mortgage and each and every one of the liens, rights and interests of Wolf 
under the Leasehold Mortgage shall survive Closing." (R. 196). 
Alleging that the sale of ASCU stock was a default under the Leasehold 
Mortgage, Wolf commenced the underlying action in September 2007, seeking 
a judicial decree of foreclosure that would permit Wolf to become sole tenant 
under the SITLA Lease, as well as expenses and costs under the Leasehold 
Mortgage. (R. 1-11). 
The parties conducted fact discovery and in December 2009, Wolf 
moved for partial summary judgment, urging the district court to hold ASCU 
in default under the Due-on-Sale Clause. (R. 187-191). In support of its 
motion, Wolf submitted an affidavit of its counsel, Bradley E. Rauch dated 
February 5, 2009.5 Among other things, the Rauch Affidavit purported to 
describe the parties' negotiations, the exchange of Leasehold Mortgage drafts, 
and the parties' intentions. Through the Rauch Affidavit, Wolf alleged for the 
first time that the Second Exception "was intended to provide Wolf 
5
 Hereinafter, the "Rauch Affidavit," a true and correct copy of which is 
attached as Exhibit 5 to the Wolf Combined Reply. 
Mountain—the "Mortgagee"—with the right to enter into a joint transaction 
with ASCU to sell both of their interests in the resorts and its underlying 
lands to a third party without triggering the Due-on-Sale Clause." Rauch 
Affidavit at ^ 23. ASCU opposed Wolfs motion and cross-moved for partial 
summary judgment under Utah R. Civ. P. 56. ASCU explained that the 
extrinsic evidence confirmed ASCU's reading: that the Second Exception 
carves out an exception to default under the Due-on-Sale provision and, 
therefore, the transfer of ASCU's capital stock to TaHsker Canyons—which 
met the terms of the Second Exception—was not an event of default under 
the Leasehold Mortgage. 
The district court issued a Ruling and Order on March 26, 2010 
denying Wolfs motion and granting ASCU's cross-motion. The district court 
observed that 
[t]he negotiated terms are not precisely reflected in the 
final Leasehold Mortgage. Read literally, it would allow the 
Mortgagee (Wolf) to transfer its rights. It is clear that the 
intent was for the interests of ASCU to be transferred 
subject to Wolfs interests, not the other way around. 
The literal language [of the Second Exception] is 
nonsensical as the word Mortgagee in the first two phrases 
of 4A(ii) is an error and the only reasonable construction is 
that the [S]econd [E]xception applies to the transfer of 
ASCU's rights, not the transfer of Wolf s interests. The 
court is to avoid an unreasonable interpretation. If 
the sale of ASCU's stock is an event of default 
creating an exception to the sale of Wolf s stock 
(there is no Wolf stock) [the Second Exception] 
makes no sense It makes even less sense to say 
Wolfs transfer of rights is subject to Wolfs rights. But 
making an exception for ASCU does make sense. 
The Talisker sale specifically indicates that now 
Talisker is subject to the liens, rights and interests of Wolf 
under the mortgage, further evidencing that such an 
interpretation makes sense. 
(R. 299-321) (emphasis in original). The district court carefully set forth the 
reasons for its decision: 
1. The contract as a whole "leaves NO DOUBT, on its 
face, apart from the 'mortgagee' - 'mortgagor' conflict, 
what was intended. This was intended to secure Wolf 
against defaults by ASCU, and to protect ASCU from 
a foreclosure unless it made a transfer that did not 
protect Wolfs rights and interests." (Ruling and 
Order at 13). 
2. "Wolf transferring its assets, and as a limited liability 
it owns no stock of course) cannot be a default under 
such a Leasehold Mortgage. A Due on sale clause, of 
course, is designed to protect the interests of the 
mortgagee (Wolf) by giving the mortgagee a remedy if 
the mortgagor transfers its interests. Thus, the 
entire purpose of the entire document on its face is 
clear." (Ruling and Order at 14). 
3. "Further, the remedies section of the Leasehold 
Mortgage provides relief for Wolf as mortgagee. If 
read as Wolf argues, the remedies section would 
allow Wolf to default in some fashion, then foreclose 
the mortgage as the defaulting party or accelerate 
the benefits due to Wolf from ASCU under the 
mortgage. That is an absurdity and grants Wolf the 
right to absolutely and arbitrarily terminate the 
contract. See Peirce v. Peirce. That is a construction 
that is to be avoided under Utah law." (Ruling and 
Order at 14). 
4. "Wolf has no interest in the Mortgaged Estate as that 
term is defined in the Leasehold Mortgage. 
'Mortgaged Estate' means ASCU's interest in the 
SITLA lease." (RuHng and Order at 15). 
5. "Wolfs reading ... ignores parts of the second 
exception. It defines 'substantially all' as being 
substantially all of the assets of ASCU, not 
Wolf...Thus, it is clear from the entire exception that 
the assets are defined as belonging to mortgagor, 
ASCU." (RuHng and Order at 16). 
6. "Wolf is not the tenant under the Ground Lease but 
ASCU is the tenant under the Ground Lease. Given 
that provision alone, the court can discern the intent 
of the parties that ASCU, as mortgagor, may transfer 
its assets without being in default but only if Wolf s 
rights are preserved." (RuHng and Order at 16). 
7. "The court, as noted, FROM THE DOCUMENT 
ITSELF, because as a legal matter there is no facial 
ambiguity, makes the determinations it has made. 
The court has not relied on the extrinsic evidence but 
on the language in the document and the nature of 
the agreement and its purposes." (RuHng and Order 
at 20). 
Thus, the court below properly interpreted the Leasehold Mortgage in 
accordance with Utah law and granted ASCU's cross-motion. 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
The Court should affirm the district court's March 26, 2010 RuHng and 
Order in its entirety. As the district court carefully explained in its 22-page 
order, the only reasonable interpretation of the Second Exception to the Due-
on-Sale-Clause, as determined from the face of the document as a whole, is 
that the provision intended that ASCU be in default upon sale but not if 
Wolfs interests and rights were protected. Thus, with the obvious 
typographical errors corrected to reflect the parties' actual intentions, Wolfs 
foreclosure complaint fails to state a claim. 
The district court determined that "based on the face of the document," 
the Leasehold Mortgage is unambiguous. (R. 310). Accordingly, it properly 
excluded the parties' extrinsic evidence. The district court carefully assessed 
whether and the extent to which each party's interpretation of the Second 
Exception accords with Utah law governing contract interpretation. 
The district court properly determined, and careful analysis of the Due-
on-Sale Clause and Second Exception makes clear, that the parties must 
have intended the first two instances of "Mortgagee's," (i.e. Wolfs), in the 
Second Exception to be "Mortgagor's," (i.e. ASCU's). Conversely, Wolfs 
literal reading of the obvious typographical errors yields the kind of 
untenable results Utah courts endeavor to avoid. The district court's decision 
is supported for the following reasons: 
• The parties must have intended to use the word "Mortgagor" 
because the plain language of the contract documents 
demonstrates that ASCU—and not Wolf—is the Tenant under 
the Ground Lease and Mortgaged Estate. 
• Wolfs reading ignores language in the Due-on-Sale clause and 
Second Exception and leads to a nonsensical result. First, 
conditioning Wolfs transfer of its own interests on compliance 
with Wolfs rights and interest under the Leasehold Mortgage is 
absurd. Second, Wolfs reading creates an irreconcilable 
inconsistency within the Second Exception. The Second 
Exception states that a transfer of "substantially all" of 
"Mortgagee's" assets shall constitute an event of default, but goes 
on to state: "'substantially all' shall include all of the assets held 
by Mortgagor FASCU1 which are necessary for unimpeded 
operation and development of The Canyons resort as it currently 
exists or may be improved." (Id.) 
• Wolfs interpretation is inconsistent with the purpose of the Due 
On Sale Clause and related Exceptions. Wolfs reading subverts 
the meaning of the due-on-sale clause, which is intended to 
protect Wolf as mortgagee against unauthorized sales or 
transfers by ASCU as mortgagor and would allow Wolf to 
construct a default by transferring its own interests. 
• The sale of ASCU's stock did not violate or constitute a default 
under the Leasehold Mortgage because it complied with the 
Second Exception, as it was intended to read. 
• The district court reached its result on the basis of contract 
language alone, and correctly excluded extrinsic evidence. 
Consequently, ASCU respectfully requests this Court to fully affirm the 
district's rulings. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I. THE DISTRICT COURT CORRECTLY 
INTERPRETED THE CONTRACT AS A MATTER OF 
LAW. 
A. The Plain Language and Purpose of the Contract as a Whole 
Demonstrate that the District Court's Interpretation is the Only 
Reasonable Interpretation as a Matter of Law. 
1. Contract Interpretation 
The matter of interpreting a contract is a legal question. See Oakwood 
Village LLC v. Albertsons, Inc., 2004 UT 101, H 8-9, 104 P.3d 1226. The 
court must look at the plain language of the contract to ascertain the parties' 
intent. Envirocare of Utah v. Utah State Tax Com'n., 2009 UT 1, f 3, 201 
P.3d 982. Utah law is clear that "[t]he primary rule in interpreting a contract 
is to determine what the parties intended by looking at the entire contract 
and all of its parts in relation to each other, giving an objective and 
reasonable construction to the contract as a whole." Sears v. Riemersma, 655 
P.2d 1105, 1107 (Utah 1982). "Where questions arise in the interpretation of 
an agreement, the first source of inquiry is within the document itself. It 
should be looked at in its entirety and in accordance with its purpose. All of 
its parts should be given effect insofar as that is possible." Big Cottonwood 
Tanner Ditch Co. v. Salt Lake City, 740 P.2d 1357, 1359 (Utah App. 1987) 
(citing Larrabee v. Royal Dairy Products Co., 614 P.2d 160, 163 (Utah 1980)). 
So long as the language within the four corners is unambiguous, courts 
"look no further than the plain meaning of the contractual language." Mid-
American Pipeline Co. v. Four-Four Inc., 2009 UT 43, | 19, 216 P.3d 352; see 
also Daines v.Vincent, 2008 UT 51, 137, 190 P.3d 1259 f[W]e do not need to 
resort to the admission of parol evidence on the question of intent, because 
absent a finding of facial ambiguity, 'the parties' intentions must be 
determined solely from the language of the contract."') 
In addition, contracts must be construed in a manner that harmonizes 
their various provisions and avoids an absurd result. See Olympus Hills 
Shopping Ctr., Ltd. v. Smith's Food & Drug Ctrs., Inc., 889 P.2d 445, 458 
(Utah App. 1994) (stating courts should avoid unreasonable interpretations 
when a contract provision would reduce the contract to absurdity.) (citing 
Barnhart v. McKinney, 682 P.2d 112, 120 (Kan. 1984)). Thus, "a construction 
which contradicts the general purpose of the contract or results in a hardship 
or absurdity is presumed to be unintended by the parties." LDS Hosp., Div. 
of Intermountain Health Care v. Capitol Life Ins. Co., 765 P.2d 857, 859 
(Utah 1988) (citing Campbell v. Ticor Title Ins. Co., 209 P.3d 859, 862 (Wash. 
Sup. Ct. 2009); see also Burt v. String fellow, 143 P. 234 (1914) ("In arriving at 
a conclusion [as to the meaning of a contract] all the words and expressions 
used by the parties in the contract must be given full force and effect, unless 
to do so leads to an absurdity or is contrary to the manifest purpose and 
intention of the parties.") 
The standard is similar vis-a-vis contractual ambiguity. When 
determining whether the plain language of a contract is ambiguous, courts 
"attempt to harmonize all of the contract's provisions and all of its terms."' 
Central Fla. Invs., Inc. v. Parkwest Assocs., 2002 UT 3, f 12, 40 P.3d 599. 
Although the district court concluded, and the parties do not dispute, that the 
Leasehold Mortgage is unambiguous, ASCU and Wolf nonetheless offer 
competing constructions of the Due-On-Sale Clause and Second Exception. 
However, a provision is not necessarily ambiguous "simply because one party 
seeks to endow [it] with a different meaning than that relied upon by the 
drafter." Buehner Block Co. v. UWC Assoc, 752 P.2d 892, 895 (Utah 1988). 
A court will find ambiguity in contract language "only if it is reasonably 
susceptible to more than one interpretation." Mid-America Pipeline Co., 2009 
UT 43, If 19, 216 P.3d 352. The different interpretations must be "competing" 
and "contrary;" if the parties argue for interpretations that are essentially 
the same, there is no ambiguity. Daines, 2008 UT 51 at f t 29, 31. Moreover, 
a party cannot successfully claim an ambiguity if its proposed interpretation 
is the product of forced or strained construction. Id. at f 30 n.5. 
2. The District Court Interpreted the Leasehold Mortgage in 
the Only Way that Harmonizes its Provisions and 
Effectuates their Purpose. 
The district court recognized that strictly as written, the Leasehold 
Mortgage led to an absurdity. If the sale of Wolf s interests was intended to 
be an event of default under the Due-on-Sale clause, the Leasehold Mortgage 
cannot be construed as a coherent whole. On the other hand, if the first two 
"Mortgagee5"s" in the Second Exception were corrected to "Mortgagor's/' the 
whole of the Leasehold Mortgage can be reasonably and objectively 
constructed. Accordingly, it was not error to grant summary judgment in 
ASCU's favor. 
The purpose of a due-on-sale clause is to protect a mortgagee's interests 
by conditioning the mortgagor's ability to sell or otherwise transfer the real 
estate subject to the mortgage. Thus, Black's Law Dictionary, 8th ed., defines 
"due-on-sale clause" as "a mortgage provision giving the lender the option to 
accelerate the debt if the borrower transfers or conveys any part of the 
mortgaged real estate without the lender's consent." Black's makes no 
mention of a due-on-sale clause protecting the interests of the borrower-
mortgagor—because that would make no sense. 
ASCU and Wolf intended the Leasehold Mortgage to secure ASCU's 
obligation, under the Second Amendment to the Ground Lease, to grant Wolf 
fee simple title to lodging units in ASCU's Red Pine Village. The Due-on Sale 
clause in the Leasehold Mortgage was designed to protect Wolf as mortgagee. 
Thus, it states that 
any sale, transfer, conveyance or assignment of all or any portion 
of, or any interest in, the Mortgaged Estate [the land subject to 
the SITLA Lease], or the sale, transfer, conveyance or 
assignment of any controlling interest in and to the Mortgagor 
[ASCII] 
shall be an event of default. (Leasehold Mortgage at § 4.A(iv)(ii)). The plain 
language demonstrates that the Due-on-Sale clause is intended to protect 
Wolf, the mortgagee, where (1) ASCII sells or otherwise transfers its interest 
in the land subject to the SITLA lease or (2) a controlling interest in ASCII is 
sold or otherwise transferred to a third party. 
The First and Second Exceptions modify the Due-on Sale clause by 
carving out certain kinds of sales or transfers, so long as the transfers protect 
the rights of Wolf as mortgagee. After insertion of party names to the Second 
Exception as written, it states: 
(ii) any transfer of all or substantially all of Mortgagee's 
[Wolfs] rights in and to the development currently known 
as The Canyons (including, without limitation, all of 
Mortgagee's [Wolfs] interest as tenant under the Ground 
Lease and the Mortgaged Estate) whether effected by stock 
or asset sale, provided that such transfer shall be expressly 
subject to each and every one of the liens, rights and 
interests of Mortgagee [Wolf] under the Leasehold 
Mortgage. For purposes of the foregoing sentence, 
"substantially all" shall include all of the assets held by 
Mortgagor [ASCII] which are necessary for unimpeded 
operation and development of The Canyons resort as it 
currently exists or may be improved. 
(Leasehold Mortgage at § 4.A(iv)(ii)). Read literally, the Second Exception 
would mean that a transfer of all or substantially all of Wolf s rights in The 
Canyons (including under the Ground Lease and SITLA Lease) would not 
give rise to a default under the Leasehold Mortgage as long as the transfer 
was subject to each of Wolf s "liens, rights, and interests" under the 
Leasehold Mortgage. This makes no sense. The first two iterations of the 
word "Mortgagee's" therefore, necessarily must reflect a typographical or 
scrivener's error; that the word "Mortgagor" was intended by the parties can 
be gleaned when the Leasehold Mortgage is read as a whole. 
a. Under the Agreements' Plain Language, Wolf Is Not 
the Tenant Under the Ground Lease Nor the 
Mortgaged Estate. 
The Second Exception under the Leasehold Mortgage concerns a 
transfer of the tenant's interest under the Ground Lease. The Leasehold 
Mortgage expressly defines ASCU as Tenant on more than one occasion: 
This Mortgage is given solely for the purpose of securing Mortgagor's 
obligation set forth in Article 12 of the Second Amendment to Ground 
Lease Agreement ("Second Amendment"), dated November 12, 1999, by 
and between Mortgagor, as tenant, and Mortgagee, as landlord .... 
Leasehold Mortgage at f 2 (emphasis added). 
...that certain Ground Lease Agreement dated as of July 3, 1997, 
between Mortgagee, as landlord, and Mortgagor, as tenant, as 
amended ("Ground Lease") 
Leasehold Mortgage at ^|4(A)(iii)(a) (emphasis added). 
Further, the Ground Lease could not be clearer. It plainly states that it 
made and entered into by and between Wolf Mountain Resorts, 
L.C., a limited liability company organized under the law of the 
State of Utah with a principal place of business in Summit 
County, Utah ("Landlord"), and ASC Utah, Inc., a corporation 
organized and existing under the laws of the State of Maine with 
its principal place of business at Bethel, Maine ("Tenant") 
(Ground Lease at 1). 
As the district court correctly held: 
Wolf is not the tenant under the Ground Lease but ASCU is the 
tenant under the Ground Lease. Given that provision alone, the 
court can discern the intent of the parties that ASCU, as 
mortgagor, may transfer its assets without being in default but 
only if Wolf s rights are preserved. 
(Ruling and Order at 16). 
Although Wolf takes issue with the district court's interpretation, the 
plain, unambiguous language of both the Leasehold Mortgage and the 
Ground Lease demonstrate that ASCU is the tenant. The district court was 
thus correct in reviewing and analyzing the plain language of the Leasehold 
Mortgage as it did, without resort to extrinsic evidence. Mid-American 
Pipeline Co. v. Four-Four Inc., 2009 UT 43, 1 19, 216 P.3d 352; see also 
Daines v.Vincent, , 2008 UT 51, 1 37, 190 P.3d 1259. 
Moreover, the district court's analysis was correct in determining that 
the plain language of the Leasehold Mortgage demonstrated that Wolf has no 
"interest in the Mortgaged Estate," and thus could not trigger the Due-on-
Sale clause by transferring it. The Leasehold Mortgage defines "Mortgaged 
Estate" as "all of Mortgagor's [ASCU's] right, title and interest in and to" the 
SITLA Lease. (Leasehold Mortgage at § 1). Additionally, the Amended and 
Restated SITLA Lease also clearly defines ASCU as "Lessee." or tenant, and 
not Wolf. SITLA Lease No. 419 at 1, attached as Exhibit B to Brief of 
Appellant. Thus, pursuant to the plain, unambiguous language, the Second 
Exception's reference to "Mortgagee's interest as tenant under the Ground 
Lease and the Mortgaged Estate" necessarily must refer to ASCU's interests. 
The district court should, therefore, be affirmed. 
b. Wolfs Tortured Interpretation Ignores Material Parts 
of the Second Exception and Creates a Nonsensical 
Result. 
The terms "Mortgagor" and "Mortgagee" later in the Second Exception 
confirm that the first two iterations of "Mortgagee's" were erroneous and 
unintended. When interpreting contract language, Utah courts must "look[ ] 
at the entire contract and all of its parts in relation to each other, giving an 
objective and reasonable construction to the contract as a whole." Sears v. 
Riemersma, 65 P.2d at 1108. Wolfs tortured reading of the Second Exception 
robs the Second Exception of an "objective and reasonable construction," to 
say nothing of the Leasehold Mortgage as a whole. 
Read with the scrivener's error, the Second Exception would allow Wolf 
to transfer its interest in The Canyons so long as the transfer is subject to the 
"liens, rights and interests" of Wolf under the Leasehold Mortgage. 
Conditioning Wolfs transfer of its own interests on compliance with Wolfs 
rights and interest under the Leasehold Mortgage is absurd. However, 
creating an exception to default for the transfer of ASCU's interest in The 
Canyons provided that the transfer is subject to the rights and interests of 
Wolf under the Leasehold Mortgage makes sense and is reasonable, as the 
district court acknowledged. (R. 134, "subjecting a transfer of Wolf s rights in 
and to the development currently known as The Canyons to Wolfs liens, 
rights and interests under the Leasehold Mortgage, is not logical and is 
somewhat nonsensical.") 
Moreover, Wolfs reading creates an irreconcilable inconsistency within 
the Second Exception. The Second Exception states that a transfer of 
"substantially all" of "Mortgagee's" assets shall constitute an event of default, 
but goes on to state: "'substantially all' shall include all of the assets held by 
Mortgagor TASCUI which are necessary for unimpeded operation and 
development of The Canyons resort as it currently exists or may be 
improved." (Id.) (emphasis added). If the second sentence is properly drafted, 
which neither party disputes, it confirms that the reference in the first 
sentence to "Mortgagee's" was necessarily a scrivener's error. 
Contracts must be construed in a manner that harmonizes their 
various provisions and avoids an absurd result. See Olympus Hills, 889 P.2d 
at 458 (stating courts should avoid unreasonable interpretations when a 
contract provision would reduce the contract to absurdity) (citing Barnhart v. 
McKinney, 682 P.2d 112, 120 (Kan. 1984)); see also Burt, 143 P. at 236 ("In 
arriving at a conclusion [as to the meaning of a contract] all the words and 
expressions used by the parties in the contract must be given full force and 
effect, unless to do so leads to an absurdity or is contrary to the manifest 
purpose and intention of the parties/') Wolfs interpretation is unreasonable 
because it would create an absurdity, by requiring Wolf to place a condition 
on itself to not transfer its interests without protecting them and by creating 
an irreconcilable inconsistency within the Second Exception with respect to 
the phrase "substantially all of ASCII's assets." 
c. Wolfs Interpretation is Inconsistent With the Purpose 
of the Due On Sale Clause and Exceptions. 
There are multiple other problems with Wolfs literal interpretation of 
the Due-on-Sale clause in conjunction with the Second Exception. 
Under Wolfs indefensible reading of the Due-on-Sale clause, default 
would be triggered by the sale of either any interest in the Mortgaged Estate 
or a controlling interest in ASCU, unless such involves a transfer oiall of 
Wolf Mountain's rights in The Canyons. (Wolf Brief at 33). But Wolfs 
contorted analysis in its Brief ignores the first part of the clause ("any sale, 
transfer, conveyance or assignment of all or any portion of, or any interest in, 
the Mortgaged Estate"), insisting that only the second part of the clause is 
implicated here. (See Wolf Brief at 33, "the only trigger at issue in this case is 
the sale of ASCU"). Wolf maintains that it has an interest in the Mortgaged 
Estate. (Wolf Brief at 30, "it cannot seriously be argued that Wolf Mountain 
'has no interest in the Mortgaged Estate.'") Therefore, the reading proffered 
by Wolf of the Due-on-Sale clause and the Second Exception permit Wolf to 
trigger a default by transferring less than "all or substantially all" of its 
rights "in and to" The Canyons. Wolfs reading would thus allow Wolf to 
trigger a default of the Leasehold Mortgage and then, as the defaulting party, 
foreclose and/or accelerate the benefits due from ASCU. Wolf dismisses such 
a scenario as "speculative" and "hypothetical," (Wolf Brief at 33), but it is 
plainly the consequence of Wolf s interpretation of the Second Exception. 
More importantly, Wolfs reading would subvert the purpose of due-on-
sale clauses and render a portion of the Second Exception extraneous. If read 
literally, the Second Exception would carve out an exception to default for a 
transfer of Wolf s interest in The Canyons—which makes no sense. Under 
that interpretation, Wolf would be agreeing to not hold itself in default. But 
under the correct, intended meaning of the Second Exception, a sale or 
transfer of Wolf s interest would not run afoul of the Due-on-Sale clause. This 
is because, as set forth above, the purpose of a due-on-sale clause is to protect 
a mortgagee—here, Wolf—by limiting the ability of a mortgagor—ASCU—to 
sell or transfer the mortgaged property. Accordingly, under a proper reading 
of the Due-on-Sale clause, two situations could give rise to a default: (1) "any 
sale, transfer or assignment of all or any portion of, or any interest in, the 
Mortgaged Estate," i.e., ASCU's interest in the SITLA Lease, and (2) "the 
sale, transfer, conveyance or assignment of any controlling ownership 
interest in and to the Mortgagor [ASCU]. . .." (Leasehold Mortgage at § 
4(A)(iv)). Nothing in the Leasehold Mortgage, as properly constructed, 
provides that a transfer of Wolf s interest triggers the Due-on-Sale clause or 
otherwise constitutes a default. Thus, Wolfs tortured readings of the Due-on-
Sale clause and Second Exception cannot be rationalized. 
The remedy sections of the Leasehold Mortgage also sustain the district 
court's and ASCU's reading of the Due-on-Sale clause. Section 4.B of the 
Leasehold Mortgage states that in the event of a default, Wolf may foreclose 
the mortgage and shall have the immediate right to receive and collect rent, 
income and profits from the Mortgaged Estate. There are no remedy 
provisions in ASCU's favor. 
Further, the phrase "whether effected by stock or asset sale" in the first 
sentence of the Second Exception is also telling. As the district court 
observed, "Wolf as a limited liability Wolf has no stock, but ASCU as a 
corporation does have stock." (R.313). Thus, as applied to a sale or transfer of 
Wolfs interests, the stock language has no meaning, but as applied to a sale 
or transfer of the interests of ASCU, the added language makes complete 
sense, particularly given ASCU's right under Section 10.02 of the Ground 
Lease to assign its interests in the Ground Lease by stock or asset sale. 
The district court correctly rejected Wolfs interpretation because it is 
unreasonable and reduces the provision to an absurdity. See, e.g., Olympus 
Hills, 889 P.2d at 458. 
d. ASCU's Stock Sale Was not a Default Because it 
Complied with the Second Exception as the Parties 
Intended it to Read. 
Because the district court determined that the parties intended that a 
sale of ASCU's assets or stock is not an event of default so long as Wolfs 
rights under the mortgage are protected, it properly entered summary 
judgment in ASCU's favor. 
First, the Talisker Sale Agreement provides for the transfer of 100% of 
ASCU's outstanding capital stock from ASC to Talisker. (Talisker Sale 
Agreement at §§ 2.1, 3.2). Necessarily, the transaction "transfers] . . . a l l . . . 
of [ASCU's] rights in and to the development currently known as The 
Canyons." (Leasehold Mortgage at § 4.A). Second, the Talisker Sale 
Agreement clearly and unambiguously binds Talisker to each and every one 
of the liens, rights, and interests of Wolf under the Leasehold Mortgage. It 
states: 
9.16. Leasehold Mortgage. The Buyers acknowledge that 
pursuant to that certain Leasehold Mortgage by and 
between [ASCII], as mortgagor, and Wolf, as mortgagee, 
dated as of November 23, 2005 (the "Leasehold Mortgage"), 
the transfer of title to Buyer is subject to each and every 
one of the liens, rights and interests of Wolf under the 
Leasehold Mortgage and each and every one of the liens, 
rights and interests of Wolf under the Leasehold Mortgage 
shall survive Closing. 
(Talisker Sale Agreement at § 9.16). 
Because the Talisker Sale Agreement expressly meets the 
requirements of the Second Exception, ASC's transfer of all of ASCU's 
outstanding capital stock to Talisker Canyons does not constitute a default 
under the Leasehold Mortgage. Accordingly, Wolfs foreclosure complaint 
fails as an undisputed matter of fact and law, and summary judgment was 
properly granted in ASCU's favor. 
B. Reformation Analysis is Inapposite 
Wolf insists that the court below erred because it reformed the 
Leasehold Mortgage despite the fact that ASCU never alleged or satisfied the 
legal prerequisites for reformation based on mutual mistake. (Wolf Brief at 
18-35). The district court did not "reform" the Leasehold Mortgage in 
contravention to Utah law, it simply applied the rules of contract 
interpretation. It did, however, avoid the absurd, untenable results that 
Wolfs literal reading would have produced. 
Utah courts are charged with interpreting contracting parties' intent as 
expressed by the language of their agreement. See e.g., Glenn v. Reese, 2009 
UT 80; Cafe Rio, Inc. v. Larkin-Gifford-Overton, LLC, 2009 UT 27, f 25, 207 
P.3d 1235 (2009). Thus, as the district court properly stated, "[t]he court is to 
avoid an unreasonable interpretation." (R. 303). See also Olympus Hills, 889 
P.2d at 458 (stating courts should avoid unreasonable interpretations when a 
provisions would reduce the contract to absurdity); LDS Hosp., Div. of 
Intermountain Health, 765 P.2d at 859 ("a construction which contradicts the 
general purpose of the contract or results in a hardship or absurdity is 
presumed to be unintended by the parties.") 
In particular, it is well-established that where a typographical or 
clerical error makes a particular term or phrase inconsistent with the whole 
contract, courts are authorized to correct the error and arrive at a reasonable 
construction. Restatement (Second) of Contracts, § 202 cmt. d.6 "A written 
contract should be construed according to the obvious intention of the parties, 
notwithstanding clerical errors or inadvertent omissions therein which can be 
corrected by perusing the whole instrument." AmJur2d Contracts § 373; see 
also Starr v. Union Pacific Railroad Corp., 75P.3d 266, 269 (Kan. App. 2003) 
6
 Utah courts routinely look to Restatement (Second) § 202 when determining how to 
harmonize disparate provisions of a contract. See, e.g., Johnson v. Morton Thiokol, 
Inc., 818 P.2d 997, 1003 n. 27 (Utah 1991); Property Assistance Corp. v. Roberts, 768 
P.2d 976, 979 (Utah Ct. App. 1989). 
(citing Brown v. Lang, 675 P.2d 842 (Kan. 1984) (typographical error in 
contract does not necessarily render the contract ambiguous)); and Doe v. 
Texas Ass'n of School Boards, Inc., 283 S.W.3d 451 (Tex. App. Fort Worth 
2009) (noting that typographical mistakes must "yield to the well-established 
doctrine that written contracts will be construed according to the intention of 
the parties, notwithstanding errors and omissions, by perusing the entire 
document" (quoting City of Galveston v. Galveston Mun. Police Ass'n, 57 
S.W.3d 532, 539 (Tex.App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 2001)). 
Not surprisingly, other courts have had the occasion to employ these 
same tenets of contract interpretation in the context of a mix-up of "-ee" for "-
or" terms, similar to the issue presented with the instant leasehold mortgage. 
For instance, in Roth v. Phillips Petroleum Company, 739 S.W.2d 598 (Mo. 
App. 1987) the court interpreted a lease, determining that the contract was 
not ambiguous even though it contained the word "lessor" where logically the 
word "lessee" should have appeared in the options to renew provision. Id. at 
600. Similar to the instant action, the lessor in Roth argued that the use of "-
or" term in place of the "-ee" term created an ambiguity requiring the 
consideration of extrinsic evidence. The appellate court affirmed the trial 
court's holding "that the word lessor' was a typographical error and should be 
interpreted as lessee"' and held that the trial court would only resort to 
extrinsic evidence if it had found an ambiguity. Id. 
The Mississippi Supreme Court has similarly upheld a trial court's 
interpretation of a lease in which the term "grantee" was used in a provision 
which should have read "grantor." See Robinson v. Martel Enterprises, Inc., 
337 So.2d 698 (Miss. 1976). The Court applied the general rule that: "'[t]he 
intention of the parties must be collected from the whole agreement, and 
every word therein must be given effect, if possible, and be made to operate 
according to the intention of the parties.'" Id. at 701 (citation omitted). In 
construing the provision to read "grantor" instead of "grantee," the Court 
found that: "No apparent purpose would be served if [grantee] gave notice to 
himself of his intent to exercise the option. With the word 'grantee' in the 
clause, it has no meaning or purpose, but when the word 'grantor' is 
substituted, the clause becomes clear and its meaning readily ascertainable." 
Id. 
As in Roth and Robinson, the district court simply applied well-settled 
rules of contract interpretation to reach the only reasonable interpretation of 
the Due-on-Sale Clause, ascertaining the intention of the parties from the 
entire agreement on its face. Thus, Wolfs lengthy exposition on the law of 
contract reformation is misplaced. The district court did not purport to reform 
the Leasehold Mortgage and explicitly stated as much: 
The court does not believe it is indeed involved in a 
reformation as that concept is normally meant. The court 
finds and concludes, FROM THE ENTIRETY OF THE 
CONTRACT ON ITS FACE, that such was intended and 
the error of placing "ee" rather than "or" was the product of 
confusion or a scrivener's error. 
(R. 317) (emphasis in original). By finding that the parties erroneously 
transposed "-ee" and "-or" in the first two instances of the Second Exception, 
the district court recognized and corrected what the Utah Supreme Court in 
Guardian State Bank v. F.C. Stangl III, 778 P.2d 1 (Utah 1989), called "a 
mistake in recordation or memorialization of an agreement." It would have 
been error to grant Wolfs Rule 56 motion by slavishly applying the obvious 
typographical errors in the Second Exception. The district court's avoidance 
of an "unreasonable interpretation" did not, therefore, run afoul of 
reformation doctrine; rather, it comported with Utah law on contract 
interpretation.7 
7
 Wolf spends considerable time arguing that ASCU waived an affirmative defense of mistake by not asserting it in 
its answer, but this issue was never raised below and it is inappropriate for Wolf to rely upon such a theory on 
appeal. See State v. Winfield, 2006 UT 4, f 22, 128 P.3d 1171 ("[U]nder ordinary circumstances, we will not 
consider an issue brought for the first time on appeal...." (internal quotation marks omitted)). The trial court never 
made any such finding of waiver, has not had the opportunity to address the potential applicability of Rule 15 of the 
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, any facts giving rise to such a defense were not known until after ASCU responded 
to Wolfs complaint. Moreover, as the Utah Supreme Court has recognized, "the policy of our rules of procedure is 
to decide cases on the merits rather than pleading technicalities." Guardian State Bank v. Stangl, 778 P.2d at 8. A 
court may "reform a document if a mutual mistake is established, even if the issue of mutual mistake was not raised 
and reformation was not demanded in the pleadings." Id. (citing Mabey v. Kay Peterson Constr. Co., 682 P.2d 287, 
290 (Utah 1984)). 
C. The District Court Did Not Employ a "Lack of Clarity" Standard 
Wolf claims that the district court erred by inventing and applying a 
"lack of clarity" standard. (Wolf Brief at 16-18). Wolf is mistaken, and "[t]he 
characterization of error [ ] does not affect the right to a remedy." Guardian 
State Bank v. F.C. Stangl III 778 P.2d 1, 7 (Utah 1989). 
Wolfs mischaracterization, based on one passing reference, does not 
change the fact that the district court carefully applied the proper contract 
interpretation rules to the parties' cross-motions under Rule 56. (R. 307-08, 
319). The district court agreed with the parties that the Leasehold Mortgage 
was unambiguous and could be interpreted as a matter of law. (R. 310, "the 
court now finds and concludes, based on the face of the document, that it was 
not ambiguous."; 314, "[t]he court thus determines that the document is not 
ambiguous on its face. . . ."). The district court recited Utah law regarding 
contract interpretation and decided accordingly. (R. 308, "[t]he court 
interprets this contract in accord with Utah law"; 309-314). Wolfs 
accusations to the contrary are not supported by the record. 
POINT II. THE DISTRICT COURT PROPERLY EXCLUDED 
EXTRINSIC EVIDENCE 
The district court did not, as Wolf contends, err in excluding extrinsic 
evidence. No party has alleged the agreements at issue here are ambiguous, 
and the district court held they are not ambiguous based upon a facial 
review. Therefore, it would have been error for the district court to rely upon 
extrinsic evidence. 
The district court accurately described and applied Utah law regarding 
the role of extrinsic evidence in construing contracts. "The court must first 
make a legal determination whether there is a facial ambiguity before 
turning to extrinsic evidence." (R. 309) (citing Dairies, 2008 UT 51; Ward v. 
Intermountain Farmers Ass'n, 907 P2d. 264 (1995)). So long as the language 
within the four corners is unambiguous, courts "look no further than the 
plain meaning of the contractual language." Mid-American Pipeline Co. v. 
Four-Four Inc., 2009 UT 43, 1 19, 216 P.3d 352; see also Daines, 2008 UT 51, 
1 37, ("[W]e do not need to resort to the admission of parol evidence on the 
question of intent, because absent a finding of facial ambiguity, 'the parties' 
intentions must be determined solely from the language of the contract."') 
Although trial courts have some discretion in determining whether an 
ambiguity exists, 
[T]he proffered alternate interpretation must be plausible 
and reasonable in light of the language used . . . . [T]o merit 
consideration as an interpretation that creates an 
ambiguity, the alternative rendition must be based upon 
the usual and natural meaning of the language used and 
may not be the result of a forced or strained construction. . 
. . At minimum one universal standard applies to this 
determination: words and phrases do not qualify as 
ambiguous simply because one party seeks to endow them 
with a different interpretation according to his or her own 
interests. . . . 
Saleh v. Farmers Ins. Exch., 2006 UT 20, Tf 17 (internal citations omitted). 
The parties and district court are in agreement that the Leasehold 
Mortgage is unambiguous. Nevertheless, Wolf urges that the district court 
should have considered extrinsic evidence to determine the parties' 
intentions. Such an approach is directly in contravention to Utah law. 
Moreover, Wolfs claim that the trial court relied upon extrinsic 
evidence proffered by ASCU, but not the evidence proffered by Wolf is 
unsupported and untrue. The contract documents at issue are not extrinsic 
evidence. The contract documents were the sole source of the district court's 
interpretation. The district court painstakingly went out of his way to point 
this out several times in his Ruling and Order. See e.g. Ruling and Order at 
16, 17, 19, 20, and 21. In sum, because the both parties and the district court 
agree that the leasehold mortgage is unambiguous on its face, the district 
court properly refused to rely upon extrinsic evidence. 
CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, ASCU respectfully requests that the Court 
issue an Order (i) affirming the district court's March 26, 2010 order denying 
Wolf Mountain Resorts, L.C.'s motion for summary judgment and granting 
ASC Utah, Inc.'s motion for summary judgment, and (ii) granting such other 
and further relief as it deems just and proper. 
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